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professional and nonprofessional investors' judgments in both manufacturing and financialservices contexts. We further discuss this and other directions for future research in the "Discussion and Conclusions" section.
Section II of the paper discusses background information on the reporting of comprehensive income. Section III presents our framework and develops hypotheses. The experimental method is described in Section IV and results appear in Section V. Section VI concludes the paper by discussing our findings along with results of other studies within the context of our framework.
II. REPORTING COMPREHENSIVE INCOME Comprehensive income is net income plus other comprehensive-income
items, such as unrealized gains and losses (UGL) on investments, net losses related to an additional pension liability, and foreign currency translation adjustments (FASB 1997). For many companies, including those in financial services, UGL are the most important and volatile component of comprehensive income (Barth et al. 1995) . Prior to SFAS No. 130, companies recognized other comprehensive-income items as a component of stockholders' equity, with the specific reporting for these items governed by individual accounting standards (for example, SFAS No. 115 on marketable securities). Smith and Reither (1996) report that some companies obscured other comprehensive-income items by combining them with each other or with other stockholders' equity categories, such as paid-in capital.
In response to these reporting practices, analysts called for greater visibility and disaggregation of these items to facilitate financial analysis (Association for Investment Management and Research [AIMR] 1993, 63).
In June 1996, the FASB issued an exposure draft, Reporting Comprehensive Income, that proposed companies present comprehensive income in a performance statement, under the premise that this statement would increase the visibility of other comprehensive-income items and give equal prominence to net income and total comprehensive income (FASB 1996, paras. 50 and 63). Comment letters reflected opposition to the exposure draft, alleging that it would provide neither new information for professional investors nor useful information for nonprofessional investors.2 Preparers indicated that analysts could already extract information on the components of comprehensive income from pre-SFAS No. 130 financial statements and footnotes if they considered this information relevant for assessing corporate performance. They also argued that nonprofessional investors would be confused about when it is appropriate to use total comprehensive income or net income in assessing firm performance (FASB 1997, para. 60).
Financial-services companies expressed a particular concern that reporting UGL in a performance statement would influence nonprofessional investors' reactions to UGL volatility. Many companies maintained that UGL are not relevant for evaluating corporate performance, and that nonprofessional investors would view UGL as performance-related if presented in a statement of comprehensive income (cf. comment letters from Grafton State Bank and America's Community Bankers). Even preparers who conceded that UGL are related to corporate performance argued that they are an inappropriate measure of management performance. They based this argument on the fact that factors beyond managers' 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF PRESENTATION FORMAT FOR NONPROFESSIONAL INVESTORS'
JUDGMENTS In this section, we present a framework for evaluating how the format for presenting comprehensive income affects investors' judgments of corporate and management performance. The framework proposes that presentation format influences investors' information processing and resulting judgments by affecting the acquisition, evaluation, and/or weighting of comprehensive-income information (Hogarth 1987) . As indicated in Figure 1 , the framework models performance-assessment judgments (PAJ) as a weighted linear combination of cues, PAJ c= o + lfjE(I1) + e (Dawes 1974) . Cues E(IJ) are an individual's evaluation of specific financial-statement information (I) and are outputs of the information acquisition and evaluation processes. In the context of this study, information "acquisition" refers to an investor reading a specific financial-statement item (i.e., UGL information) and storing the item in memory sufficiently well to recall where it appeared in the financial statements. Information "evaluation" involves an investor assessing characteristics of the data, such as UGL volatility. The weight an investor places on the evaluated information characteristic (hi) reflects, in part, his perceived importance of that characteristic for judging corporate and management performance. Figure 1 shows that information weighting depends on information acquisition and evaluation.
Acquisition and Evaluation of UGL Information
Our framework indicates that different financial-statement formats can influence whether investors read comprehensive-income information. Hirst and Hopkins (1998) provide evidence on professional investors. They demonstrate that analysts detect earnings management related to investments in an electronics company only when UGL are presented in a statement of comprehensive income. In that study, half of the analysts receiving the statement of stockholders' equity did not even recall seeing the term "comprehensive income," suggesting that they did not acquire the UGL information.4 Thus, presentation
The validity of these arguments is questionable. For financial-services companies, managing investments is a core-business activity. Additionally, other core activities have factors not completely controllable by management (e.g., natural disasters for insurance companies), and yet managing these risks is part of managers' responsibilities. Finally, firms can use relative performance evaluation measures to eliminate effects of uncontrollable factors (Antle and Smith 1986 ). Additionally, it is possible for analysts to see the term "comprehensive income" and yet not read about the components of comprehensive income (e.g., UGL information). Because Hirst and Hopkins (1998) did not ask a manipulation check question specifically about the acquisition of UGL information, it is not clear whether analysts who indicated that they saw the term "comprehensive income" actually read UGL information. Weighting of UGL Volatility in Performance-Assessment Judgments While we expect nonprofessional investors to acquire and evaluate UGL information similarly in all three formats, we predict that presentation format will differentially affect the weighting they place on the information. Consequently, any differences in these investors' performance judgments will arise from differences in their information weighting. These differences in weighting are attributed to nonprofessional investors' limited understanding of financial analysis (SRI International 1987, 29), which leads them to infer the importance of comprehensive income from the way it is presented. The first performance-signal dimension, placement, refers to whether comprehensive income appears in a performance or nonperformance statement. Presentation in a performance statement, such as a statement of comprehensive income (1301S), suggests that these items represent a measure of firm performance, i.e., how well the firm has performed economically for its shareholders (FASB 1999, para. 1.1). In contrast, presentation in a statement of stockholders' equity (I115EQ and 130EQ) implies that these items are not performance-related since the statement focuses on equity funding and profit distribution, rather than profit creation (FASB 1999, para. 1.4). Thus, for the placement dimension, the 1301S format will have a positive effect on nonprofessional investors' weighting of UGL volatility, while the 115EQ and 130EQ formats will have negative effects.
FIGURE 1 Framework for the Effects of Comprehensive-Income Presentation
The second performance-signal dimension, labeling, refers to whether comprehensiveincome items such as UGL are explicitly labeled as comprehensive income. Because an "income" label traditionally denotes a performance measure (Stickney and Weil 1997, 106), associating UGL with that label will have a positive effect on weighting. This is the case for both the 130EQ and 1301S formats. In contrast, the 1 15EQ format does not label UGL as "income" and thus will have a negative effect on weighting.8
The third performance-signal dimension, linkage, focuses on the relations among financial-statement items. Specifically, linkage indicates the presence or absence of a direct association between net income and other comprehensive-income items such as UGL. SFAS No. 130 directly links these two items in two ways. First, it requires the items to be shown together as components of the comprehensive-income category. Second, it requires net income plus other comprehensive-income items to be summed and their total presented. Under SFAS No. 115, however, net income and UGL represent different categories in the statement of stockholders' equity and are not linked by a total. Thus, the 1301S and 130EQ formats will positively affect the weighting for UGL volatility, while the 115EQ format will negatively affect investors' weighting. (1978) further show that decision makers place less weight on aggregated data than they place on the same information that is disaggregated. Thus, our cognitive-costs category includes two format dimensions related to these processing costs: the isolation of comprehensive-income information from other information and the degree of aggregation of comprehensive-income items. Isolation refers to whether comprehensive income is the sole type of information presented in the financial statement. Comprehensive income presented in a statement of stockholders' equity (as in both the 115EQ and 130EQ formats) appears along with common stock, additional-paid-in capital, treasury stock, and retained earnings. An investor must expend additional cognitive costs to simultaneously process all of these items. In contrast, comprehensive income is the only information presented in the statement of comprehensive income (1301S). As a result, investors do not incur the cognitive costs of simultaneously processing additional information. The lower cognitive costs in the 1301S format will have a positive effect on the weighting of UGL volatility, while greater cognitive costs in both 115EQ and 130EQ will be associated with negative effects on weighting.
Dimensions Related to Cognitive Costs
Finally, the three formats differ on the second cognitive-costs dimension, aggregation. Both of the SFAS No. 130 formats (130EQ and 1301S) present investors with the gross changes in comprehensive income on the face of the statement, thereby disaggregating this information. In contrast, the SFAS No. 115 format (115EQ) provides only net changes in comprehensive-income items. While information to calculate gross changes is available in 115EQ, it appears in other financial statements and footnotes and requires additional cognitive costs to disaggregate. Thus, we expect that the 130EQ and 1301S formats impose lower cognitive costs and positively affect the weighting of UGL volatility, while the 115EQ format is associated with greater cognitive costs and negatively affects weighting. Table 1 Since the overall effect of the 130EQ format depends on the relative importance of each dimension, which is likely to be contextspecific, we cannot make predictions as to whether weighting for the 130EQ format will be more similar to that for the 115EQ format or that for the 1301S format. We can, however, predict that the 115EQ and 1301S formats should provide boundary conditions for the 130EQ format, with the weighting in the 130EQ format greater than or equal to that in the 115EQ format and less than or equal to that in the 1301S format. Hypothesis 3 summarizes these predictions.
H3 (Weighting): Nonprofessional investors will place greater weight on UGL volatility
when it is presented in the 1301S format than in the 115EQ format. Nonprofessional investors' weight on UGL volatility in the 130EQ format will fall between the weights for the 1301S and the 115EQ formats. The differential weighting between the formats will in turn result in similar differences in investors' performance judgments between high and low UGL volatility.
We examine nonprofessional investors' weighting of UGL volatility and their resulting judgments for three different performance measures: management's effectiveness at managing operations, stock risk, and stock value. To predict the effects of UGL volatility on these performance measures, we draw on research that examines the effects of net income volatility on stock valuation.
Archival research has shown that net income volatility is associated with higher betas (Beaver et al. 1970 ) and ex ante risk premia (Gebhardt et al. 1999 ). Studies using experimental and survey methods have also documented that investors' risk judgments increase with the variability of earnings (Farrelly and Reichenstein 1984; Farrelly et al. 1985; Lipe 1998b) . Consistent with Ryan (1997), we argue that the volatility of other comprehensiveincome items will also affect investors' risk perceptions.9 Specifically, investors' perceptions of the riskiness of a firm's investment policy will increase with UGL volatility.'0 Because investing is a core activity for insurance companies, we expect the risk associated with investments to affect investors' overall assessments of the risk of the company's stock. Given that managers in financial-services companies are responsible for managing risks of investment portfolios, we also expect that investors' perceived UGL volatility will negatively affect their judgments of management's operating effectiveness. None of the participants had professional investment experience. Participants received materials related to one of two versions of an insurance company that reported either high or low UGL volatility over a three-year time period. The financial statements presented UGL information in one of three formats: 115EQ, 130EQ, or 1301S. We randomly assigned participants to one of the six between-subject experimental conditions created by factorially crossing the two levels of UGL and the three format presentations.
The study materials consisted of four components: general instructions, background information on the property-and-casualty-insurance industry and the fictional insurance company, three years of financial statements and footnotes for the company, and two question sets. Common-size statements for three companies in the insurance industry (Allstate, As Ryan (1997) notes, however, archival research to date has not provided direct evidence on whether fair value accounting (e.g., recognizing UGL on investments) helps investors assess risk. 0 The effect of a comprehensive-income component on risk is a function of both its variance and covariance with other comprehensive-income components. To avoid ambiguity, we designed our experiment so that the variance of UGL was the primary driver of the variance of comprehensive income. We investigated whether nonprofessional investors have significant ownership in insurance stocks. Participants responded to two separate sets of questions. In the first question set, they made several performance judgments. Management's effectiveness at managing operations was judged on a 14-point scale, with 1 indicating "not effective" and 14 indicating "very effective." The risk of investing in the company's stock was judged on a 14-point scale, with 1 indicating "low risk" and 14 indicating "high risk." Participants also provided a per-share dollar value for the stock.'3
The second set of questions related specifically to UGL. Participants completed this question set without referring to any of the study materials or responses to the first set of questions. In these last questions, participants assessed the volatility of unrealized gains, indicated where UGL information was located in the financial statements, and responded to demographic questions about their business and investment experiences. 13 In addition to these three judgments, participants made two judgments in the second question set related to management's effectiveness at managing investments and the likelihood that the historical pattern of realized gains on investments would continue three years into the future. Results for these two judgments were qualitatively similar to those reported in Tables 3 and 4 Hypothesis 2 predicts that because nonprofessional investors read UGL information in all formats, investors receiving high UGL volatility will perceive UGL to be more volatile than those receiving low UGL volatility. To test H2, we examine participants' perceptions of the volatility of UGL (denoted PVOL). Table 2 
Weighting of Perceived Volatility for Performance Judgments (H3)
Hypothesis 3 predicts that format will affect participants' judgments of corporate and management performance due to differences in the weightings of UGL volatility. Specifically, H3 predicts that the weights on UGL (and their effects on related performance judgments) will be greatest in 1301S, smallest in 115EQ, and between the weights of 115EQ and 1301S for 130EQ. Tables 3-5 where: PAJik = performance assessment judgment k (e.g., management effectiveness) made by participant i; PVOLi = participant i's perceived volatility assessment; and Eik = random error term for assessment k made by participant i; Tables 3-5. Second, to test for differences in the coefficients on PVOL among the three formats, we perform a regression for each judgment that pools observations for all formats, using indicator (dummy) variables to allow both the intercept and the coefficient on PVOL to vary by format. This pooled regression tests for differences in the coefficients on PVOL between 115EQ and the other two formats, 130EQ and 1301S. The 115EQ format is the baseline condition for estimating the coefficient on PVOL (x3k), with indicator variables D1 and Do representing 130EQ and 1301S, respectively. Thus, a-4k measures the difference for the coefficients on PVOL between the 130EQ and 115EQ formats and Xk measures the difference between the 1301S and 115EQ formats. The difference in the coefficients on PVOL between the 1301S and 130EQ formats is represented by OL5k -4k. We test the pairwise differences among formats using the t-statistics related to the associated indicator-variable coefficients 7 For all regressions, we identified outliers using procedures described in Neter et al. (1989, chap. 11 The results in Table 3 indicate that only 1301S prompts nonprofessional investors to reflect UGL volatility in judging management effectiveness. Additionally, as predicted by H3, the effects of 130EQ lie between those of 1301S and 115EQ. The results further suggest that the effects of 130EQ are indistinguishable from those of 115EQ, but the pooled regression provides some evidence that the 1301S format leads to greater weighting of UGL volatility relative to the 130EQ format. Table 4 presents results for participants' judgments of stock risk, which should increase in UGL volatility. The results parallel those for management effectiveness reported in Table  3 . Panels A and B of Table 4 , respectively, indicate that participants distinguish between low and high UGL volatility, and significantly weight volatility, only when UGL are presented in the 1301S format. The pairwise format comparisons in Panel A show that the difference in risk judgments between high and low UGL volatility is greater for 1301S than 115EQ (t = 1.55, p = 0.0630), as predicted. Similarly, Panel B shows that participants place greater weight on perceived volatility in 1301S than 115EQ (t = 2.14, p = 0.0173). Table 5 presents results for participants' stock-value judgments, which should be negatively related to UGL volatility. Results for this judgment generally do not support H3. First, the differences in mean stock values between high and low volatility in Panel A are insignificant for each format, perhaps reflecting variability in value judgments arising from participants' inexperience in making such judgments. As discussed previously, nonprofessional investors typically do not estimate specific values for stocks (SRI International 1987, 26), so participants may have had difficulty making these judgments in the experiment.
Results of these regressions appear in the top halves of Panels B in
Panel B shows that the coefficient on perceived UGL volatility is significantly negative for 115EQ (I = -1.23, t = -2.66) and marginally negative for 1301S (P1 = -0.47, t = -1.42), but is not significantly different from zero for 130EQ. Tests of differences in coefficients among formats show that none are significant in the predicted direction. These results are somewhat puzzling given the findings for management effectiveness and stock risk, again indicating that nonprofessional investors had difficulty with this judgment or that other unidentified factors affected participants' stock values.
Supplemental Experiment for Performance Assessment Judgments
In our primary experiment, we used a three-year UGL series corresponding to the time period typically provided in an annual report. Given our volatility manipulation, using three years of data made it impossible to avoid having a pattern in the series. In particular, our UGL series had a mixed pattern (high, low, medium for 19X1, 19X2, and 19X3, respectively), with an overall downward trend that was most noticeable in the high-volatility series. Therefore, we performed a supplemental experiment to examine the possibility that participants reacted to trend vs. volatility or that trend and volatility interacted. In this experiment, holding constant high UGL volatility, we manipulated trend at two levels. The first UGL pattern was the one used in the primary experiment ($234.9, $10.6, and $78.4 million for 19X1, 19X2, and 19X3, respectively). The second pattern of $90.8, $2.1, $231.0 for these three years had the same total UGL and approximately the same variance as the first, but an upward tend.18 Twenty-six M.B.A. students participated in the experiment. They assessed UGL volatility and judged management's effectiveness and stock risk for one of the two trend conditions (stock valuations were not elicited).
Results of this supplemental experiment indicate that the trend of UGL did not influence how volatility affected participants' judgments, i.e., there were no interactive effects of trend and volatility. Participants' average UGL volatility assessments and the coefficients related to the mapping of these assessments into their two performance judgments (corresponding to the Al regression coefficients on PVOL in Tables 3 and 4) did not differ between the two trends. These results suggest that trend did not influence the effects of volatility on participants' performance judgments in our primary experiment.
Although trend did not interact with volatility in our supplemental experiment, we found a direct effect of trend on one of participants' two judgments, stock risk. Participants judged stock risk to be greater for the downward-vs. upward-trend series. These findings suggest that trend may have contributed to the large difference between high and low volatility for risk in the 1301S format (Panel A of Table 4 ). Trend could not be the sole determinant of the difference, however, because participants did place significant weight on UGL volatility to arrive at their risk judgments (Panel B of Table 4 ). Additionally, we found no effect of trend on participants' judgments of management effectiveness in the supplemental experiment, suggesting that trend does not have the systematic effects indicated for volatility in our primary experiment.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The results of our experiment show that the financial-statement format for presenting comprehensive income did not significantly affect nonprofessional investors' acquisition and evaluation of that information, but generally did significantly influence their information weighting and resulting performance judgments. Our results suggest that SFAS No. 130 will affect nonprofessional investors' use of comprehensive-income items only if companies issue a separate statement of comprehensive income, rather than use the alternative statement of stockholders' equity format that is also currently permitted. Given that individual 18 We could not create strictly downward and upward trends since we needed a fairly large unrealized gain in Table 1 , placement and isolation are the only two dimensions for which this is the predicted pattern. These results are consistent with arguments made by the FASB and corporate managers that placement in a performance vs. nonperformance statement provides signals about the importance of comprehensive-income information.
Investigating the effects of format using an experimental research method is important given that most companies appear to be selecting the statement of stockholders' equity to present SFAS No. 130 informational If the vast majority of firms elect the statement of stockholders' equity, there may not be sufficient variation in archival data to test differences between formats. Also, archival data may be confounded by self-selection problems because companies choosing the statement of comprehensive income may be those more effective at managing investments. Additionally, it is difficult to disentangle the individual effects of format for analysts and nonprofessional investors using aggregate measures such as market prices. As indicated by McDaniel and Hand (1996) , experiments can examine accounting alternatives not commonly used in practice, as well as isolate effects of variables on different groups of financial-statement users.
Our results, in combination with Hirst and Hopkins (1998), suggest that presenting comprehensive-income items in a performance statement improves both nonprofessional and professional investors' judgments. From these two studies, we identify two specific factors that are likely to mediate the effects of format on investors' acquisition, evaluation, and weighting processes: type of investor (professional or nonprofessional) and type of business activity (core or noncore). Crossing these two variables forms a 2 x 2 matrix of mediating variables.
For professional investors such as analysts, the effects of format on performance judgments may depend on whether comprehensive-income information is related to core-or noncore-business activities. We expect that format will have little or no effect on analysts' acquisition of information related to core activities since this information is critical to the accuracy of their forecasts and stock recommendations.20 That is, analysts will search for information related to core activities regardless of where it is located, consistent with Lipe's (1998a) arguments for the use of UGL by bank analysts. In contrast, as demonstrated in Hirst and Hopkins (1998), format can affect professional investors' acquisition of information related to noncore activities. Because noncore activities are less important to a company's valuation, they may not be included in analysts' valuation models and thus would be acquired only through accidental discovery in the search for more relevant information. If analysts fail to acquire the information, they cannot include it in their performance or valuation judgments. On the other hand, we expect the effects of format on nonprofessional investors' judgments will not differ between core and noncore activities, since these investors do not clearly distinguish between financial information for these two activities (SRI International  1987, 26, 29) . Thus, nonprofessional investors are likely to acquire and evaluate characteristics of information for both core and noncore activities regardless of format.21 However, as found in our experiment, nonprofessional investors will tend to rely on the financial statements to signal the importance of information, suggesting that the weight they attach to both core and noncore information will depend on presentation format. The signaling effects of financial-statement format are likely to be mitigated only by nonprofessional investors acquiring training in financial analysis.
Our results and those of Hirst and Hopkins (1998) are not directly comparable since both investor and business-activity types differ between the two studies. Future research could reconcile the two studies by examining the effects of format on: (1) nonprofessional investors' use of comprehensive-income information related to noncore activities, and/or (2) analysts' use of comprehensive-income information related to core activities. For the first, we predict results similar to those found in the current study, i.e., nonprofessional investors' judgments will be influenced by information related to noncore activities only when presented in a statement of comprehensive income. Results might reveal potential negative effects of using a performance statement, that is, the overweighting of noncoreactivity information. Such a result, in comparison to results of our study, illustrates a tradeoff faced by the FASB. In effect, the FASB has to balance the misallocation of resources created by nonprofessional investors' underweighting of core-activity information presented in a statement of stockholders' equity against the overweighting of noncore-activity information presented in a statement of comprehensive income. However, given that noncore activities typically occur less frequently than core activities and are smaller in magnitude, our findings related to the underweighting of value-relevant comprehensive-income information likely represent a more serious cost.
A second experiment could address the effects of format on professional investors' use of comprehensive-income information related to core activities. However, archival research has already documented that UGL are associated with stock prices and returns for insurance companies (Petroni and Wahlen 1995; Dhaliwal et al. 1999) . We can reconcile the differences between these archival findings and those of Hirst and Hopkins (1998) since managing investments is a core activity for insurance companies, but is a noncore activity for electronics firms. Thus, Hirst and Hopkins' (1998) results may illustrate a situation where experts' valuation models, which generally provide accurate judgments, can be dysfunctional ( Finally, one additional avenue for future research is to examine more thoroughly the effects of format dimensions (see Table 1 ) on individuals' acquisition, evaluation, and 21 However, seven of the 32 nonprofessional investors in the 130EQ format failed to indicate that they saw UGL in the statement of stockholders' equity, instead indicating that they acquired this information from the footnotes. Although this percentage (22 percent) is considerably less than that found by Hirst and Hopkins (1998) for professional investors (50 percent), it suggests that format may have some effect on acquisition for nonprofessional investors. In addition, since all participants in the 115EQ format correctly noted that UGL appeared in the statement of stockholders' equity, the effects on acquisition for nonprofessional investors appear to be unique to the statement of stockholders' equity allowed under SFAS No. 130.
weighting. Rather than focusing on specific formats proposed by policy makers, these studies could manipulate aspects of the underlying format dimensions. This approach would enhance the applicability of our framework to format issues other than those related to comprehensive income. When securities are sold the realized gain or loss on sale is recorded as "Realized Gains or Losses on Investments" in the Income Statement. At that time, any portion of the gain or loss that was previously shown as an unrealized gain or loss in "Other Comprehensive Income" is reclassified from "Other Comprehensive Income" to "Realized Gains or Losses on Investments" using a reclassification adjustment.
The gross unrealized holding gains and losses on fixed maturity and equity investments are shown below. 
Gross

